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Abstract: 
 
This paper analyzes trends in different components of trade of transition countries. To explain 
the cross-country differences, the paper points out the important distinction between the 
determinants of inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade (IIT), and horizontal and vertical 
IIT. Using varieties of gravity models, it is shown that variables from Increasing Returns Trade 
Theory, such as scale economies, similarity of income levels, and number of varieties produced 
play important roles in IIT, especially in horizontal IIT, whereas factors such as comparative 
advantage, dissimilarity in income levels, and having more developed trade partners of 
Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory are crucial in determining inter-industry trade and vertical IIT 
to a lesser degree.   
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1.  Introduction 
The empirical success of gravity equation in explaining trade volumes is indisputable. 
However, whether this success is evidence in support of which of the two main competing 
trade theories is still not clear. Although several authors in search for a theoretical basis came 
up with models that are based on Increasing Returns Trade Theory (Anderson, 1979; 
Bergstrand, 1985, 1989, 1990), Deardorff (1995) characterized gravity equation with two cases 
of Heckscher-Ohlin Theory. To resolve this issue, Evenett and Keller (2002) examined the H-
O and the IR theories together to conclude that both theories explain different components of 
trade volume, and thus found theoretical support for both in gravity models.  
This paper intends to contribute to this discussion empirically. Fast evolving transition 
countries’ trade with their developed and developing partners in 1990s are analyzed. Given the 
heterogeneity across transition countries, this geographical area provides a perfect setting to 
examine the role of these competing theories in different components of trade.
1     
Gravity models are typically used to explain total trade volume. Since parts of this total 
trade are explained by different trade theories, there is a need to decompose total trade into its 
parts and analyze each component separately. Section 2 further elaborates on the need to 
decompose and then decomposes total trade into its inter- and intra-industry parts, as well as 
vertical and horizontal parts of intra-industry trade.  
In Section 3, regressions derived from different forms of gravity models are run separately 
on each trade component to examine the role of competing trade theories. It is found that 
elements of H-O theory such as large factor endowment differences, measured by dissimilarity 
in income levels, and relative revealed comparative advantage, as well as elements of IR theory 
like economies of scale, and number of varieties produced help explaining inter-industry trade   2
and intra-industry trade (IIT), respectively. Both H-O theory and IR theory factors play a 
smaller role in vertical IIT, as it stems from relative factor intensity differences within an 
industry. This finding supports Greenaway and Torstensson’s (2000) empirical analysis of 
OECD trade. Section 4 concludes the paper with comparison of results with recent research on 
other regions. 
 
2.  Decomposition of total trade 
Inter-industry trade is a consequence of different factor endowments and the resulting 
specialization predicted by Heckscher-Ohlin trade models. This trade theory is believed to 
explain mainly the trade between developed and developing countries. On the other hand, 
intra-industry trade has been significant between developed countries, resulting in a series of 
research to become the Increasing Returns Trade Theory built around the Krugman (1979) 
model.
2  
Intra-industry trade is composed of two significantly different parts. Horizontal IIT occurs 
when similar products are simultaneously exported and imported mainly due to product 
differentiation. Vertical IIT is defined by Grubel and Lloyd (1975) as the simultaneous export 
and import of goods in the same industry but at different stages of production. This results 
from vertical disintegration of production due to varying factor intensities within an industry.      
Given the theoretical differences explaining each component of trade, there is a clear need 
to decompose total trade into its parts. In fact, Greenaway et al. (1995) demonstrate that a 
failure to separate horizontal and vertical IIT can negatively impact the interpretation of 
empirical results.
3 Widely cited use of decomposing trade into its intra- and inter-industry 
components is adjustment cost estimation, where IIT type changes in trade as a result of   3
liberalization are expected to cause lower adjustment costs. An extension of this reasoning is 
used in Kandogan (2003) for decomposing IIT into its horizontal and vertical parts, given that 
the latter also stems from factor intensity differences, although these are within-industry 
differences. Broll and Gilroy (1988) give another reason for decomposing trade by examining 
the relation between intra-industry trade and technology diffusion.  
A frequently used method to decompose IIT into its parts is based on ratio of unit values of 
exports. This technique has been criticized by the randomness in the choice of threshold ratio, 
which is used to determine whether IIT in an industry is vertical or horizontal.  Therefore, a 
newer method proposed in Kandogan (2003) is used in this study. This method is based on the 
definitions for each part of IIT provided earlier. It uses values of exports and imports at two 
different levels of aggregation without any need for data on quantity of exports and imports. 
The higher level of aggregation defines industries, and the lower level of aggregation defines 
different products in each industry. Trade in products of an industry are aggregated to find the 
trade in that industry as follows: 
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Using trade data at higher level of aggregation, the total amount of IIT in each industry is 
computed by finding the amount of exports matched by imports, following Grubel-Lloyd 
(1975). Then, the amount of matched trade in each product of an industry is computed using 
data at lower level aggregation. This gives the trade of similar products, i.e. horizontal IIT.  
The rest of the IIT in this industry is the trade of different products or products at different   4
stages of production within that industry, i.e. vertical IIT. Unmatched part of the total trade 
(TT) in the industry is inter-industry trade (INT): 
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Data on trade is obtained from International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO that uses SITC 
Revision 3. Trade of 10 Central and East European countries (CEEC), and 12 Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) countries with 18 developed and 10 developing trade partners are analyzed. 
Partner countries are chosen to represent the most important trade partners for the transition 
countries. Data covers the period of 1992-1999, which immediately follows the trade 
liberalizing Europe Agreements between the CEEC and the EU. FSU countries are considered 
separately since their trade liberalization has been regional, if at all, among themselves under 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) customs union.
4 Table 1 provides the list of 
transition countries analyzed, and their trade partners.  
Figure 1 plots the exports and imports of transition countries. It is observed that major EU 
countries dominate the CEEC trade, as well as EU countries in close proximity to CEEC such   5
as Austria. The role of economic size, proximity, and liberalization agreements is clear. 
Although the same major EU countries are important players in CIS trade, the US and Japan, 
as well as regional powers surrounding CIS countries, such as Finland, Turkey and China have 
important places in CIS trade. Given its relative small size, Turkey’s trade with Central Asian 
countries is striking.
5 Common language might be an important determinant. 
When decomposing this total trade into its parts, the 4-digit level is used to define products, 
and the 2-digit level for industries. Figure 2 gives the trends in inter-industry, horizontal and 
vertical IIT of transition countries over the period analyzed. It is seen that trade volume of 
transition countries soared in the 1990s, with particularly strong increases in vertical and 
horizontal IIT. Djankov and Hoekman (1996) also find high growth rates in vertical IIT of 
CEEC with the EU in their early analysis, and reason it with high inflows of foreign direct 
investment. While five Visegrad countries dominate the charts of CEEC, Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus appear to be the most important countries in CIS charts. It is interesting that while 
Russia’s inter-industry trade with its partners is the highest among all transition countries, it is 
practically absent in both horizontal and vertical IIT charts.  
The aggregation of 2-digit results into 1-digit categories produce sector level results such as 
those in Figure 3. This figure depicts the volumes of different types of trade in 9 sectors, 
summed over all transition countries. It is seen that more than half of trade in the 
manufacturing and the machinery sectors are IIT, where the share of vertical IIT is almost 
equal to that of horizontal IIT.
6 Specialization is particularly strong in fuels, crude materials, 
and animal and vegetable oils sectors, where most of the trade is of inter-industry type. This 
explains the earlier observation on Russia’s trade. Overall, this figure tells that IIT, especially 
HIIT, is more common in sectors where there is significant production differentiation such as   6
manufacturing. It is insignificant, in sectors with standardized products such as natural 
resources, where most trade is inter-industry.  
The choice of partner also affects the composition of trade, as seen in Figure 4. A big 
percentage of trade with developed countries is IIT, with bigger share in horizontal IIT.
7 Intra-
industry trade takes only a small portion of trade with developing countries, where the majority 
of IIT is vertical. This figure points out the role of different income levels, and relative factor 
endowments in explaining the volume of different components of trade. As countries become 
similar in factor endowments, and thus income levels, inter-industry trade loses its dominance, 
and horizontal IIT becomes more important.  
 
3.  Gravity models 
In this section, determinants of total trade, and each component of total trade are analyzed 
using a variety of gravity models. Regression (1) in Table 2 is the simplest form of gravity 
model, where total trade is regressed against GDP of both transition and partner country, and 
the distance between the capitals of the two countries.
8 Countries are expected to trade more if 
their economic size is larger, and the distance in between is smaller. All gravity models in this 
study strongly support this expectation.  
Modified versions of such models can be obtained with the addition of more variables: 
Liberalization, common language, common border, and foreign direct investment are all trade-
promoting factors. Their effects are captured by dummy variables in regression (2). All expect 
common border are shown to have significant positive effects on total trade volume.   
Further additions to the model come from specific trade models: The Heckscher-Ohlin 
Trade Theory explains trade by differences in factor intensities. A number of different   7
variables are used in regressions (3)-(5) to capture this: dissimilarity in per capita GDP, 
dummy variable for developed partner, and relative revealed comparative advantage (RRCA). 
All except RRCA seem to have significantly positive effects on the total trade volume. 
Increasing Returns Trade Theory implies higher trade volumes, when there are scale 
economies, income levels are similar, and there is product differentiation. Regressions (6) and 
(7) support this theory using number of products that transition countries import and export to 
proxy for product differentiation.
9 Economies of scale is captured by GDPs of both the 
transition countries and their partners. Since it is also part of the simplest form of the gravity 
equation, its significance cannot yet be used in support of this theory in gravity models 
explaining total trade.  
Note that neither theory perfectly explains total trade by itself: Dissimilarity of income 
appears to increase total trade volume, which is supported by the H-O theory but it is 
contradictory to the IR theory. Similarly, relative revealed comparative advantage seems to 
decrease the total trade volume, against the H-O theory’s predictions. Using different 
combinations of variables in regressions (8) and (9) does not affect the sign or the significance 
of the coefficients. A possible explanation for this is that each theory explains different 
components of trade, and gravity models considered so far tried to explain the total trade.  
Table 3 gives the results of gravity models where different components of total trade are 
treated separately. In these regressions, explanatory variables are regressed against each 
component of trade with the addition of dummy variables for horizontal and vertical IIT, and 
interaction of these dummy variables with explanatory variables. These models help us analyze 
whether the effects of explanatory variables are different for each component of trade.   8
 Regression (1) shows that distance is a more important trade dampening factor for IIT, 
especially for vertical IIT.
10 This result is expected since vertical IIT requires a product to 
travel the distance between the countries twice at different stages of production. It is also seen 
that the GDP of both transition and partner country significantly increases horizontal IIT, with 
insignificant increases in vertical IIT. This should not be considered as a strong evidence for 
the effect of scale economies on IIT, as it loses its significance in later regressions.
11  
In regression (2), significantly more positive effect of liberalization on IIT relative to inter-
industry trade is noteworthy. Liberalization has a positive effect, especially on horizontal IIT. 
The effects of common language, and FDI are significantly positive on only inter-industry 
trade, whereas FDI significantly decreases the volume of horizontal IIT. The purpose of FDI in 
transition countries seems more to exploit differences in comparative advantage than easier 
access to local markets. Dissimilarity of per capita GDP increases inter-industry trade, and 
decreases both IIT, with a smaller decrease in its vertical part. This result can be construed as 
evidence for both H-O and IR theories.  
Regressions (3)-(5) analyze the effects of other IR and H-O theory variables. It is observed 
that IR variables, such as the number of products exported or imported, have more positive 
impacts on IIT components, especially horizontal IIT. Similarly, the H-O variable RRCA has a 
more negative impact on IIT, in smaller magnitudes for vertical IIT. Dummy variable for 
developed partner has a positive impact on all components of trade, with an additional impact 
on IIT, especially its vertical part. 
So far, the evidence for both theories is not conclusive. The varying effects of product 
differentiation, comparative advantage, and difference in income on each component of trade 
are encouraging and in support of both theories. However, there is still a positive effect of the   9
number of products, and a negative effect of RRCA on inter-industry trade, which is against 
the expectations of IR and H-O theories, respectively.  
These problems are eliminated when IR and H-O variables are regressed against shares of 
each component of trade rather than the volume of each in Table 4. In these regressions, 
economies of scale, measured by GDP of both countries, has a negative effect on the share of 
inter-industry trade, and positive effects on shares of both IIT, especially horizontal IIT. This 
accompanied with negative effect of number of products on share of inter-industry trade, and 
positive impact on shares of both IIT with much bigger impact on horizontal IIT can be viewed 
as evidence in support of IR theory in explaining IIT. Furthermore, it is also observed that 
RRCA now has a positive effect on the share of inter-industry trade and a negative impact on 
the shares of IIT components, with slightly smaller impact on vertical IIT.
12 This presents an 
evidence supporting the H-O theory’s in explaining inter-industry trade. Dissimilarity of 
income levels increases the share of inter-industry trade, and decreases that of both parts of IIT, 
in support of both H-O and IR theories, respectively. Lastly, in these regressions, the effect of a 
common border becomes significant on vertical IIT, and the effect of FDI on IIT, especially 
vertical IIT, is strengthened.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the determinants of components of trade using the trade between 22 
transition countries with 28 developed and developing countries over 1992-1999. It showed 
that the inter-industry component of trade is explained by the Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory, 
and the intra-industry trade components are explained by the Increasing Returns Trade Theory 
with some impact of the H-O Theory on its vertical part. Since gravity models try to explain   10
total trade, composed of these components, both of the competing trade theories are behind the 
success of the gravity models.  
This paper used a more recent technique to decompose IIT into its vertical and horizontal 
parts, to obtain results that are in conjunction with recent studies on other regions: Ekanayake 
(2001) examines Mexican IIT without decomposing it into its vertical and horizontal parts. He 
finds that IIT is positively correlated with income level, country size, trade intensity, trade 
partners, common border, and language, and liberalization agreements; and negatively 
correlated with inequality in income and country size, distance, and trade imbalance. Kim and 
Choi (2001) decompose Korean IIT into its parts using the ratio of export unit values. They 
conclude that vertical IIT is explained by differences in per capita income and FDI, whereas 
horizontal IIT is primarily determined by product differentiation, per capita income level.   
Decomposing eight CEEC’s IIT using the ratio method, Aturupane et al (1999) find that the 
total IIT is determined primarily by product differentiation, scale economies, and FDI. 
Horizontal IIT positively related to FDI and product differentiation but negatively to scale and 
labor intensity. This paper also points out the role of income similarity to explain total IIT, and 
the effect of common borders on vertical IIT. Contrary to Aturupane (1999), stronger effect of 
FDI is found on vertical IIT.   
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Transition Countries 
Central and East European (CEEC)  Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
Bulgaria (BG) 
Czech Republic (CZ) 
Estonia (EE) 
Hungary (HU) 
Latvia (LV) 
Lithuania (LT) 
Poland (PL) 
Romania (RO) 
Slovakia (SK) 
Slovenia (SI) 
 
Armenia (AM) 
Azerbaijan (AZ) 
Belarus (BY) 
Georgia (GE) 
Kazakhstan (KZ) 
Kyrgyzstan (KG) 
Moldova (MD) 
Russia (RU) 
Tajikistan (TJ) 
Turkmenistan (TM) 
Ukraine (UA) 
Uzbekistan (UZ) 
 
Trade partners 
Developed Developing 
Austria (AT) 
Belgium-Luxembourg (BE) 
Canada (CA) 
Denmark (DK) 
Finland (FI) 
France (FR) 
Germany (DE) 
Hong Kong (HK) 
Italy (IT) 
Japan (JP) 
Netherlands (NL) 
Norway (NO) 
Singapore (SG) 
Spain (ES) 
Sweden (SE) 
Switzerland (CH) 
United Kingdom (GB) 
United States (US) 
Brazil (BR) 
China (CN) 
Egypt (EG) 
Greece (GR) 
Indonesia (ID)  
Korea (KR) 
Philippines (PH) 
Portugal (PT) 
Thailand (TH) 
Turkey (TR) 
 
Table 1. List of transition countries and their trade partners  
Notes: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as considered outside the FSU because of 
the similarity in their relations with the EU to other CEEC.  
Partner countries are grouped into developed and developing based on their average 
GDP per capita PPP during the period analyzed, where the cut off is set at $15,000. 
   15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Transition countries trade with their partners   16
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Endnotes:  
1 In a different framework, Aturupane et al. (1999) analyze the intra-industry trade of eight 
Central and East European nations with the European Union during 1990-95. This paper 
extends the analysis to all transition countries to include the former Soviet Union, and their 
developing and developed trade partners, including the EU.   
2 Although the large volume of IIT is often cited as an element favoring Increasing Returns 
Trade Theory over H-O Theory, Davis (1995) provides an account of IIT within H-O 
framework with technical differences. 
3 For example, Durkin and Krygier (2000) find positive relation between income differences 
and IIT in OLS regressions, and negative relation in fixed-effect regressions is due failure to 
separate out the vertical IIT.  
4 In December 1995, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan formed a customs union, which 
Kyrgyzstan joined in December 1996.  
5  For detailed analysis of Turkish IIT with Central Asian countries, see Gonel (2001). 
6 Analyzing different set of countries, Bhattacharyya (2002) also finds that relatively high 
levels of IIT in machine and transport equipment sectors, and manufacturing.  
7 Incidentally, analyzing the trade of developing Asian and Latin American countries’ trade, 
Bhattacharyya (2002) finds that similarity in level of development is important for IIT. 
8 The data for distance is obtained from US Census. Its measurement uses the latitude and 
longitude of the two places, and calculates the direct distance as the crow flies.  
9 Due to high correlation between FDI and number of products transition countries export, FDI 
is omitted from the model in regression (7). 
10 IIT is also found to decline more significantly with distance in Clark and Stanley (1999).   23
                                                                                                                                                          
11 Clark (1993) does not find support for the role of scale economies in explaining IIT. 
12 Durkin and Krygier (1998), and Torstensson (1996) find empirical support for the effect of 
comparative advantage in explaining vertical intra-industry trade as well. 
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